Adverse health outcomes for uninsured patients have been attributed to their health status and to the quality of treatment received. A question about treatment that remains unexplored is whether physicians treating the uninsured are more likely to have characteristics indicative of lower quality than physicians treating insured patients. Using education, training, experience, and board certification to measure physician quality, we find that uninsured and Medicaid patients are treated by lower-quality physicians both because of the hospitals these patients attend and because of sorting within hospitals. The effects are statistically significant, but small.
Health care access for the poor and uninsured in the United States is a complex problem. From 2000 to 2006, the number of uninsured people rose from 38.4 million to 47 million, while hundreds of hospital emergency rooms, the primary source of health care for many of the uninsured, were closed (De Navas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2008) . Uninsured patients rely on emergency departments for care due to difficulty accessing office-based physicians, and insured Americans have significantly increased demand for emergency care as part of an overall increase in demand for medical care (Cunningham and May 2003) . The increase in emergency department visits places a financial burden on hospitals, since uninsured patients are less likely to pay for care and hospitals face lower payments from private insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid. Thus, the poor face a health care system that while superficially guaranteeing access, has strong incentives to limit the quantity and quality of care.
A large body of empirical evidence documents adverse health outcomes for the uninsured. Baker et al. (2001) and Lichtenberg (2001) found that adult mortality and morbidity were higher for the uninsured relative to the insured. The common explanations that are advanced to explain these adverse outcomes rely on the fact that the uninsured generally use fewer preventive and screening services and are generally sicker when diagnosed. Kozak, Hall, and Owings (2001) and Pappas et al. (1997) also showed that the uninsured have higher rates of avoidable hospitalizations.
Adverse health outcomes for the poor and uninsured can also occur because the quality of acute and therapeutic care received by the uninsured may be worse than that received by insured patients. Theoretical research on health care quality has focused on the costs and quality of care for insured patients. The disconnect between third-party payers and insured patients in health care markets results in an inherent tension between maintaining quality and minimizing costs. Most studies conclude that maintaining quality of care is often a function of the level of reimbursement, and of patient demand for and information about quality (Ellis and McGuire 1986; Pope 1989; Ma 1994; Chalkley and Malcolmson 1998) . For uninsured patients, the problem is likely to be more acute since reimbursement is limited and patients are unlikely to be informed about quality. Empirical research on quality generally relies on outcome measures such as mortality rates or complication rates, or ''treatments'' such as total charges, length of stay, or receipt of a specific procedure across insured and uninsured patients (Canto et al. 2000; Currie and Gruber 1996) .
Our study focuses on a previously unexplored aspect of care-the quality of physicians treating the uninsured. We study how physician quality as measured by quality of schooling, residency, years of experience, and board certification varies based on the patients' ability to pay. In particular, we focus on whether poor or uninsured patients are less likely to be treated by higher-quality physicians; we do this by studying the characteristics of physicians treating patients at hospitals across Florida in 2004.
The actual or perceived quality of the physician treating a patient may be correlated with patient outcomes for a number of reasons. Most obviously, physicians with higher-quality training are expected to provide better care. In a study of coronary artery bypass surgery in New York, Jha and Epstein (2006) showed that treatment by the ''best'' physicians, as measured by risk-adjusted mortality rates and volume, can reduce mortality in two common cardiac procedures by as much as 50%. In addition to providing better therapeutic care, more skilled physicians may have priority access to test results, operating rooms, and better nurses. There could be placebo effects if patients are reassured that they are under the care of the ''best'' physician. There is certainly a presumption that the quality of physicians is important to patients even if the effects on the outcome are not measured. Hospitals and physician groups often advertise where their new hires were trained, and many insurance companies attempt to provide information about physician attributes to prospective patients.
Our empirical goal is to test whether physicians treating uninsured and Medicaid patients are more likely to have characteristics indicative of lower quality than those treating privately insured or Medicare patients. There are two processes by which poor patients may be treated by lower-quality physicians: one, upon admission to a hospital, poor and uninsured patients may be directed to lower-quality physicians within the hospital; or two, poor and uninsured patients may be more likely to use hospitals where the average physician quality is lower. Many physicians we spoke with felt that quality of physician care was higher at some hospitals than others, and the main variation in quality is across, rather than within, hospitals. If hospitals located in areas with large populations of poor, minority, or uninsured patients employ lower-quality physicians on average (or if their physicians with privileges are of lower quality), this could be a significant contributing factor to existing racial and ethnic disparities in the quality of care.
Two models are estimated to address each of these processes. To determine whether there is sorting of physician quality by patient's ability to pay within a hospital, we use a hospital fixed-effects model that holds hospital characteristics constant across patients within the hospital, such as administrative policies, available technology, and average physician quality. To analyze the insurance mix and physician quality across hospitals, we estimate a model without hospital fixed effects that includes hospital characteristics as control variables.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a background on patient sorting. A description of the data and empirical methodology follow. Finally, we present and discuss our empirical results. million people without insurance, access to this care is an important determinant of health outcomes. Yet hospitals located in areas with large low-income populations may have difficulty attracting higher-quality physicians. Norton and Staiger (1994) found that for-profit hospitals indirectly avoid the uninsured by locating less frequently in areas with low-income populations, an indication that hospitals do consider the demographics of possible locations. Since location has been the primary determinant of patients' choice of hospital, if hospitals located among or near low-income populations have fewer highquality physicians this increases the probability that the uninsured are treated by lower-quality physicians.
Within each hospital, the sorting of uninsured patients to lower-quality physicians may occur at the physician level or at the hospital level. The reasons for physicians to discriminate against uninsured patients are widely known. Physicians receive payments from Medicare, Medicaid, and privately insured patients, yet payment from uninsured patients is not guaranteed. Medicaid patients also may be discriminated against since Medicaid fees paid to physicians may be lower than payments received from privately insured and Medicare patients. In Florida, the state focused on in this study, Zuckerman et al. (2004) found that in 2003 Medicaid fees paid to physicians for all services were 65% of Medicare fees, on average.
Higher-quality physicians are more likely to have choices regarding how many and which patients to treat, while newer, lesserknown physicians are likely to treat all patients, at least in the early stages of their careers. Also, since insured patients pay far less than 100% of costs, their demand for medical care is more inelastic than uninsured patients' demand for care. Thus physicians may induce more care from insured patients.
Recent research has also indicated that the greater use of public report cards on physician quality may increase access disparities (Mukamel, Weimer, and Mushlin 2006; Werner, Asch, and Polsky 2005) . Public report cards typically report physician quality using measures of patients' health outcomes with the intention of helping consumers make more informed choices that will result in better health outcomes. However, these report cards may create incentives for physicians to avoid high-risk patients to improve their ratings. If physicians believe that lowincome patients are at higher risk for poor outcomes, changes in physician behavior to improve ratings could worsen existing disparities in health care.
While hospitals are required to treat all patients who seek emergency care, anecdotal evidence suggests that hospitals are well informed about the exact nature of a patient's insurance coverage; any visit to a hospital typically begins with an inquiry about insurance coverage. If a hospital has financial incentives to attract insured patients over poor and uninsured patients, the hospital may sort patients not only by diagnoses but also by insurance status when assigning physicians to treat patients. Although patients typically cannot observe the quality of physician they receive upon entering a hospital, the hospital staff and administration are well informed of the physicians' quality. Thus hospitals may be able to establish formal and/ or informal policies regarding treatment of the poor. For instance, in a survey of more than 2,000 physicians at U.S. health centers, 13% of responding faculty reported formal practice policies limiting care given to uninsured patients (Weissman et al. 2003) .
Using hospital discharge data, it is not possible to discern how physicians are assigned to patients. Our discussions with local physicians revealed that when an uninsured patient arrives at a hospital emergency room (ER), either the ER physician on call or a hospitalist first treats the patient. If a cardiology consult is required, the primary physician then calls in a specialist. Most physicians whom we spoke with saw patients when it was their turn-apparently as a result of rotation of ER assignments through the practice, or as a favor to the physician calling them to consult. This suggests that the sorting revealed in this paper could result from network effects. If the initial physician contacted were younger or from a lower-ranked school, he or she might arrange a consultation with a physician from the same cohort. In addition, higher-quality physicians may be busier and less able to accept new patients. Similar incentives would be at work in hospitals, particularly for their salaried physicians. Insured patients on the other hand, are more likely to have prior contacts with their own physicians and to be treated by them, which may also explain why they may see higher-quality physicians. Similarly, if the average quality of physician in a hospital is low because of regional differences, the physician ultimately assigned also may be of lower quality. Hadley and Holahan (2003) found that in 2001 uncompensated care accounted for 60% of the care received by people who were uninsured for the full year and 17% of the care received by people uninsured for part of the year. Also, based on the American Hospital Association's Annual Survey of Hospitals, throughout the 1990s hospitals incurred approximately 6% of their total expenditures in costs for patients who did not pay their bills in each year (Medicare Payment Advisory Committee 2001). Although the uninsured typically pay less than 100% of their hospital care, hospitals may receive payments from government sources to help offset the costs of uncompensated care. Based on our calculations from the 2004 Florida hospital data, not-for-profit and investor-owned short-term hospitals provided $1.96 billion in uncompensated care, which was offset somewhat by the receipt of just under $82 million from restricted and unrestricted funds, for a net total of $1.88 billion in uncompensated care. 1 Since these government payments are not related to the quality of care provided to the uninsured, there is no disincentive to assign patients to the physicians who are in least demand, and also may be of lower quality.
Data Description
To analyze the characteristics of physicians treating inpatients in Florida hospitals, we study patients treated for procedures classified under the major diagnostic category of ''diseases and disorders of the circulatory system,'' which are related to the heart. Many previous studies have focused on patients with heart disease to study questions of hospital behavior toward the treatment of patients based on insurance status (Canto et al. 2000; Hadley, Steinberg, and Klag 1992; Young and Cohen 1991; Kreindel, Rosetti, and Goldberg 1997) . By focusing on one diagnostic category, we avoid potential estimation bias that could result from correlations between the number of uninsured within a specialty and average physician quality across specialties. We use patient and hospital data from all four quarters in 2004, provided by the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. Florida inpatient hospital records are matched to data on physician and hospital characteristics.
Physician Characteristics
Our hypothesis is that uninsured patients will be treated by lower-quality physicians. We use three physician characteristics to proxy physician quality-the quality of the medical school and residency program attended by the physician, years of experience, and board certification. Quality of care is measured by the quality of the operating physician who treats the patient, or if the patient does not have an operating physician, the quality of the attending physician. Data on physicians are provided by the Medical Quality Assurance Division of the Florida Department of Health. We use providers' first year in practice, board certification(s), medical school attended, and residency and/or fellowship location(s) to construct three different measures of physician quality: a continuous measure of the physician's years of experience, an indicator for whether the physician is board certified in an area related to cardiac care, and an indicator for whether the physician either graduated from one of the top 30 medical schools and/or completed a residency at one of the top 50 hospitals for cardiac care in the United States.
The U.S. News & World Report (USNWR) publishes annual rankings of medical schools in the country (U.S. News & World Report 2006a 2 ) and rankings of U.S. heart hospitals (U.S. News & World Report 2006b). We create a single indicator equal to one for ''top-trained'' physicians and equal to zero otherwise, where we define ''top-trained'' as having graduated from one of the top 30 medical schools in the United States or having completed a medical residency at one of the top 50 heart hospitals in the United States (similar to the definition of ''star'' physicians in Burke, Fournier, and Prasad 2007) . As suggested by an anonymous referee, a physician who graduates from the top of the class at a lower-ranked school and completes a high-quality residency is comparable to a physician who graduates at the bottom of the class at a top-ranked school and completes a residency at a substandard hospital. Also, since the USNWR rankings include only institutions in the United States, our measure of ''top-trained'' physicians will include international medical graduates (IMGs) who graduated from a prestigious medical school in another country but completed a highly ranked residency at a heart hospital in the United States. Physicians who are still residents are not included in the sample.
Board certification has requirements beyond obtaining a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine (D.O.) degree and completing a residency program at an accredited school. Physicians also must pass examinations given by a specialty board, and many boards require evaluations from the physicians' medical colleagues.
While we do not specifically examine the effect of physician quality on performance or outcomes, a number of papers have previously studied the impact of these characteristics on patient outcomes. Doyle, Ewer, and Wagner (2008) showed that patients treated by physicians from higher ranked schools have shorter and less expensive stays than patients assigned to physicians from lower ranked institutions. Lichtenberg (2009) found that increases in life expectancy were more rapid in states where the number of physicians trained in top medical schools was growing. Physicians from lower ranked medical schools or residencies were also more likely to be sued for medical malpractice (Weycker and Jensen 2000) .
In a study of 80 physicians treating potentially serious outpatient conditions, Leonard, Masatu, and Vialou (2007) found that years of training was an important determinant of physicians' knowledge of how to properly diagnose their patients' illnesses and to communicate the diagnosis and treatment to the patient. Numerous studies have found that physicians who have more experience with a particular surgery have lower patient mortality rates and fewer complications than physicians with less experience (Wen et al. 2006 ; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2004). However, there also have been contradictory findings when using measures such as post discharge use of statins or beta blockers in acute myocardial infarction (AMI) patients (Austin et al. 2008a ). Pearce et al. (1999) and Rogers et al. (2006) found positive effects of board certification and physician volume on mortality rates in Florida for some vascular surgery procedures and colorectal cancer surgery, respectively. Austin et al. (2008b) and Chen et al. (2006) found appropriate post discharge drug-prescribing practices were more likely among physicians who were board-certified.
The exact relationship between years of experience and physician quality is ambiguous. For cardiac-related procedures, several studies have shown that higher volumes of coronary artery bypass graft surgeries by hospitals and physicians are associated with lower mortality rates (Wen et al. 2006 ; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2004). While physicians with more experience may have more learning-by-doing, younger and less experienced physicians may be more familiar with the latest technologies in cardiac care. Using our data, the correlation of physicians' years of experience and patients' survival probability revealed a significantly negative correlation between years of experience and patients' survival probability at diagnosis. This suggests that physicians with more years of experience are typically assigned to patients with lower survival probabilities; that is, patients with more serious diagnoses are treated by more experienced physicians.
Patient Characteristics
As frequently discussed in the literature, there is a strong likelihood that the researcher does not observe all indicators of patient health that are perceived by hospital staff and used in treatment decisions. If there are unob-served health differences between uninsured and insured patients' health that influence treatment decisions, estimated results could be biased. 3 In addition to the patient demographic information such as age and race shown in Table 1 , we include three controls for patients' health. First, within the primary cardiac diagnosis code, we categorize diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) according to average DRG weights, which indicate the relative severity of the patient's illness and are directly proportional to DRG payments. We create four diagnosis severity indicators: ''very severe,'' ''severe,'' ''somewhat severe,'' and ''mild,'' where the latter is the omitted category (a list of DRGs in each of the four categories is available on request from the authors). We expect patients with ''very severe'' and ''severe'' diagnoses to be treated by more qualified physicians, all else equal.
Second, we control for 11 secondary diagnoses that would indicate the health status of the patient at the time of admission, following Baker et al. (2001) : diabetes, hypertension, cancer, dementia, stroke, vascular disease, an old myocardial infarction, other heart disease, pulmonary disease, respiratory disease, and obesity.
We also construct a measure of survival risk, the International Classification of Diseases, ninth revision (ICD-9), Injury Severity Score (ICISS). For each of the patient's ICD-9 diagnoses (one primary and up to nine secondary), survival risk ratios (SRRs) are derived by dividing the number of survivors in each ICD-9 code by the total number of patients with the same ICD-9 code. ICISS is calculated as the simple product of the SRRs for each of a patient's diagnoses. In recent empirical work by Osler et al. (1996) , Rutledge et al. (1998), and Huynh et al. (1998) , the ICISS has been shown to outperform other standard measures of patient severity. We use the entire population of 2,512,406 inpatients to construct the ICISS.
Summary statistics on patient characteristics are shown in Table 1 . We group the payment categories into four payment types: uninsured, Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance. For the overall sample, over 50% are age 70 or older, 50% are female, and the average patient survival risk (ICISS) is 79. On average, Medicare patients enter with the worst health: they have the poorest survival risk (indicated by the lowest survival risk score), and the lowest percentage classified with only ''mild'' diagnoses. Table 2 shows summary statistics on physicians' years of experience, board certification, and school/residency quality across patient characteristics. 4 The percentage of patients treated by board-certified physicians is lowest for uninsured patients, relative to those with another insurance status. However, the percentage of uninsured patients treated by physicians from top schools or residencies is higher relative to the insured groups. The average experience of physicians is highest among those physicians treating Medicare patients.
Hospital Characteristics
Information on Florida hospitals is based on the Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting System, run by the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. The ownership and teaching status of hospitals are the hospital characteristics most commonly discussed in both the theoretical and empirical literature. A number of studies have shown that hospital ownership can affect the care provided to uninsured patients (Norton and Staiger 1994; Sloan et al. 2001) . A for-profit hospital may have stronger incentives to maximize cash flows from insured patients than would a nonprofit or government hospital. For instance, for-profits have been found to bill more or ''up code'' patient diagnoses (Sloan et al. 2001; Silverman and Skinner 2004) . Sloan et al. (2001) also found that for-profit hospitals were more expensive for the Medicare program than not-for-profit hospitals, although there were no differences in health outcomes by hospital ownership. In contrast, government hospitals may have limited capacity to sort patients by insurance status to different quality physicians because government hospitals typically are mandated to provide care to the poor, and thus may have higher percentages of poor patients.
To determine whether there are differences within hospitals in patient sorting by physician quality across hospital ownership types, we include indicators for three hospital types: government, teaching, and for-profit hospitals, with not-for-profit hospitals the comparison group. Teaching hospitals are excluded from the other three ownership categories because among both providers and patients, a perception exists that teaching hospitals: a) have the highest quality physicians, and b) have a greater percentage of uninsured patients than (non-teaching) not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals. In our sample, the range of physician quality was smaller in teaching hospitals than in non-teaching hospitals. charge for heart failure patients is also included. 5 Table 1 shows that relative to privately insured and Medicare patients, higher percentages of uninsured and Medicaid patients are treated at government and teaching hospitals. Also, on average, uninsured and Medicaid patients enter hospitals that have higher percentages of poor patients, where poor patients are those who are uninsured or on Medicaid. For example, across all uninsured patients the mean percentage of poor patients at the hospitals attended is 28%; the mean percentage of poor patients at hospitals attended by Medicare patients is 21%.
For illustrative purposes, we also divide the hospitals by ownership status and percentage of admitted patients who are poor; a hospital has a higher percentage of poor patients if the percentage of poor patients at the hospital in 2004 is higher than the median across all hospitals. Across government and teaching hospitals, the percentage of patients treated by a board-certified physician is lower at hospitals with higher percentages of poor patients; however, at not-for-profit hospitals, those with more poor patients have a higher percentage of patients treated by boardcertified physicians. Surprisingly, the percentage of patients treated by a top-trained physician is higher at hospitals with a higher percentage of poor patients for not-for-profit, government-owned, and for-profit hospitals. In the empirical model, the continuous measure of the percentage of poor patients at a hospital is used as the right-hand side variable.
There are 406,654 inpatient records with cardiac-related diagnoses that match data on hospitals and physicians. We only include patients in general or teaching hospitals that the hospital has prioritized as an emergency or urgent admission, as opposed to an elective admission, since patients who have time to schedule appointments with physicians may be able to wait for treatment by their personal physician or to obtain recommendations for a particular physician. After merging all patient, physician, and hospital data meeting these categories, we have 344,393 inpatient records in our sample. Our final exclusion was to omit records for hospitals that treated fewer than five patients, or had fewer than three physicians. After these final exclusions, we have 344,202 observations for our estimated model. However, the number of observations in each model depends on whether data were missing on physician and/or hospital characteristics.
Empirical Methodology
As mentioned previously, poor patients may be more likely to be treated by lower-quality physicians if they attend hospitals with lower average physician quality, or if poor patients are sorted to lower-quality physicians within hospitals. To estimate a patient's treatment within a hospital, our level of observation is patient-physician-hospital specific. For person i treated by physician p in hospital h, the estimated equations are:
where qual pih is the quality of physician p treating patient i; and coefficients b 1 , b 2 , and b 3 measure the relationships between physician quality and the patient payment type of uninsured, Medicaid, or privately insured, respectively. Medicare patients are the comparison group. In addition to the patients' characteristics in Table 1 , we include indicators for day admitted (Sunday-Thursday). Finally, m h represents the hospital fixed effects. We let Q represent all right-hand side variables and use the usual exogeneity assumptions: E e ih jQ ð Þ~0. A hospital fixed-effects model allows us to explore the variance in patients' treatment within a hospital, but eliminates variation in average physician quality (and all other hospital characteristics) across hospitals. Although within-hospital sorting by patients' insurance status is possible, it is more probable that patients are sorted by insurance status across hospitals of varying average physician quality. That is, the average physician quality in hospitals located in areas with large numbers of uninsured and Medicaid patients may be lower than hospitals located in higher-income areas. Therefore, we also estimate an empirical model that includes hospital characteristics, such as the hospitals' insurance mix, to determine how hospital characteristics are related to the characteristics of the physician treating the patient.
For person i treated by physician p in hospital h, the estimated equations are: 
where ForP is an indicator for for-profit (investor-owned) hospitals, Govt is an indicator for government-owned hospitals, and teaching is equal to one for teaching hospitals and zero otherwise. For teaching hospitals, the indicators for Govt and not-for-profit hospitals (the reference category) are both set to zero. The percentage of patients admitted to the hospital who are uninsured or on Medicaid is labeled %Poor Patients. Coefficients a 5 ,a 6 , and a 7 on the hospital types measure whether the quality of physicians treating patients at for-profit, government, and teaching hospitals, respectively, is higher or lower than the quality of physicians treating patients in notfor-profit hospitals, on average. The indicators for hospital ownership are interacted with %Poor Patients to see whether the relationships between physician quality and the hospital's insurance mix depend on the type of hospital. The coefficients on the interactive terms, a 8 ,a 9 , and a 10 should indicate whether differences in physician quality across hospitals of various percentages of poor patients is greater across for-profit, teaching, or government hospitals than across not-for-profit hospitals. The right-hand side variable %Poor Patients has a quadratic functional form because in graphs with %Poor Patients on the horizontal axis and predicted values of our dependent variables on the vertical axis, the rate of change in the predicted values of the dependent variable was not constant over %Poor Patients. The rate of change also varied across the hospital types.
For both equations 1 and 2, a regression model is used when physician quality is measured by physician's years of experience, and a probit estimator is used when physician quality is measured by an indicator for board certification or for top training. All models include robust standard errors.
Results
Tables 3 and 4 report results from estimating the hospital fixed-effects model of equation 1 and the model with hospital characteristics of equation 2, respectively. As mentioned previously, by including hospital fixed effects in the estimated model in Table 3 we eliminate all variation in physician quality across hospitals, and instead focus on patient sorting within a hospital. For the probit models of board certification and top training, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the physician treating the patient has the highquality characteristic and zero otherwise. In order to observe the change in probability in the probit models, marginal effects are calculated at the individual observation level, and the marginal effect of a dichotomous variable is a change in the dummy variable from zero to one. The results in Table 3 and Table 4 show the means of the marginal effects, and standard errors of the marginal effects over all in-sample observations. Standard errors were obtained using the delta method.
Results for uninsured and Medicaid patients are quite similar in Tables 3 and 4, and indicate that these patients are less likely to be treated Physician Quality by a board-certified physician and are treated by physicians with slightly less experience, relative to Medicare patients. Medicaid patients are also less likely to be treated by a physician from a top school or residency; all these results are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. In both Table 3 and Table 4 , black patients are also treated by less qualified physicians using two measures of quality.
While the differences in these physician attributes across the insurance categories are statistically significant, they are so small as to have little, if any, practical significance. For example, on average, uninsured and Medicaid patients are treated by physicians with at most one year less of experience than physicians treating Medicare patients. Also, the probabilities of being treated by a boardcertified physician are only slightly lower for uninsured and Medicaid patients, relative to Medicare patients. In Tables 3 and 4, the probability of being treated by a board-certified physician is 2.5 and 2.8 percentage points lower, respectively, for uninsured patients, and 2.4 and 2.2 percentage points lower, respectively, for Medicaid patients.
As a measure of fit, we compared the predicted probabilities from the probit models in Table 3 to the raw data by categorizing the predicted outcome as equal to one if the predicted value was greater than or equal to .5 and zero otherwise. Based on the in-sample data, 68.67% of patients are treated by boardcertified physicians and the mean of the predicted probabilities is also 68.67%. Of the 188,274 observations where board certification equals one and the 85,907 observations where board certification equals zero, 98% of the first category are correctly predicted, but only 5.6% of the second are.
In-sample data also show that 25.62% of the patients are treated by a physician trained at a top medical school or residency, and the mean of the predicted probabilities is also Notes: All models include hospital fixed effects, indicators for the secondary diagnoses shown in Table 1 25.62%. Of the 81,215 observations indicating the patient was treated by a top-trained physician and the 235,752 observations indicating the patient was not, 99.2% of the first group are correctly predicted but only 3.5% of the second group are. Thus, in both models the predicted outcomes are very strong for the outcome that is most frequently observedthat is, board-certified or not trained at a top school or residency-but very weak for the less frequently observed outcomes. The estimated models in Table 4 reflect all the patient characteristics included in the models in Table 3 , but rather than include hospital fixed effects they use hospital characteristics. Including the hospital characteristics allows us to examine variations in characteristics across hospitals that may influence the probability that a patient is treated by a higher-quality physician. Based on the results in Table 4 , treatment by a board-certified or top-trained physician is positively associated with hospitals that have greater numbers of beds, more nurses per bed, or lower average heart failure charges. However, changes in these variables change the probability of being treated by a boardcertified or top-trained physician by very small amounts.
In all three models in Table 4 , the marginal effects of ''percent poor patients'' and its interactive terms are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. However, in Table 4 the marginal effects of hospital ownership or a hospital's percentage of poor patients do not capture the full marginal effect of these variables because of the effects through the interaction terms. Since the associations between the physician characteristics and hospital ownership and case mix are an important focus of this study, we calculated the full effects of these variables and summarized the results in Table 5 .
As an aid to interpretation, the predicted probabilities of treatment by a board-certified or top-trained physician are calculated at the individual observation level and shown at the top of Table 5 . 6 For column 4 in Table 5 , where physician years of experience is the dependent variable, we show the predicted years of experience for the physician treating a patient based on the patient and hospital characteristics and their respective coefficients, most of which are shown in Table 4 . The respective hospital ownership indicator is set equal to one to calculate the predictions.
The means of the predicted probabilities that a patient is treated by a board-certified physician are very similar among not-forprofit, for-profit, and teaching hospitals, as there is less than a one percentage-point difference across the means of these hospitals. Similarly, the probabilities for whether a patient is treated by a physician trained at a top medical school or residency for teaching, for-profit, and not-for-profit hospitals are less than two percentage points apart. The predicted probabilities of being treated by a board-certified or top medical school/residency physician are noticeably lower, at 65.1% and 22.3%, respectively, at government hospitals only. Also, the range of predicted years of experience is less than one year among all hospital types except teaching hospitals, where the mean experience level of a physician is three to four years greater than the mean experience level of physicians at the other hospital types.
Next, we examined whether the probability that a patient is treated by a well-trained physician is related to the percentage of poor patients (uninsured or on Medicaid) who are admitted to a hospital. In Table 4 , the ''percent poor patients'' variable was negatively related to the probabilities of being treated by a board-certified or top-trained physician and negatively related to experience, and all results were statistically significant at the 1% level. Results for the marginal effects of the percentage of poor patients in Table 5 show that across hospitals of a given ownership type, on average, there was little association between the probability a patient is treated by a well-qualified physician and the percentage of poor patients at the hospital. For example, across for-profit hospitals, on average, if the percentage of poor patients was 10 percentage points higher at one hospital than another, the probability of receiving a board-certified physician would be only one percentage point lower at the hospital with more poor patients.
To further explore possible differences based on hospitals' percentages of poor patients, we split the hospitals within each ownership type by the percentage of poor patients at the hospital, using the categories indicated in Table 5 . These categories are based on the quartiles of %Poor Patients across hospitals of all ownership types. We also indicate the percentage of patients in each quartile for a particular type of hospital. Noticeably, over half of patients at not-forprofit or for-profit hospitals, 56.8% and 54.8%, respectively, are in hospitals where less than 19.8% of the patients are poor. In contrast, half of patients at teaching hospitals and almost half at government hospitals are in hospitals where over 26.7% of the patients are poor.
Even when hospitals are categorized by their percentage of poor patients as shown in Table 5 , if a patient always attends a hospital of a certain ownership type, in most cases the probability that the patient is treated by a well-trained physician is similar at hospitals that have predominantly poor patients and those that do not. There are two noticeable exceptions. One is not-for-profit hospitals, where the probability a patient is treated by a board-certified or top-trained physician is 6.4 or 1.4 percentage points higher, respectively, in hospitals with the highest percentages of poor patients relative to those with the lowest. The second exception is for government hospitals, where the probability of being treated by a physician trained in a top medical school or residency is 6.6 percentage points higher at the hospitals predominantly serving the poor. Surprisingly, the probability of treatment by a board-certified physician is 11 percentage points lower for patients at government hospitals with more than 26.7% poor patients relative to those at government hospitals with less than 14.5% poor patients. This result is surprising because one would expect that the top-trained physicians are also more likely to be board certified. However, even though the probability of being treated by a top-trained physician is positively related to the percentages of poor patients across government hospitals, overall probabilities for patients at government hospitals are significantly lower than those at the other hospital types.
Overall, the probability that a patient will receive treatment for cardiac care by a boardcertified physician is highest at not-for-profit hospitals that have higher percentages of poor patients, and lowest at government hospitals with a high percentage of poor patients. Patients are also most likely to be treated by a physician from a top medical school or residency at not-for-profit hospitals, and least likely to receive a top-trained physician at government-owned hospitals, especially those where less than 27% of the patients are poor.
Concluding Remarks
Previous studies have found that the uninsured receive less medical care than the insured (Currie and Thomas 1995; Doyle 2005; Spillman 1992 ). Using statewide data on hospitals, physicians, and cardiac patients requiring urgent cardiac care, we analyze whether uninsured and Medicaid patients are more likely to be treated by lower-quality physicians in Florida. In a model including hospital fixed effects, we find that within hospitals uninsured and Medicaid patients are more likely to be treated by physicians who have fewer years of experience and who are not board certified. Medicaid patients are also less likely to be treated by physicians who graduated from a top-30 medical school or who completed a residency at a top-50 hospital. While the differences in these physician attributes across the insurance categories are statistically significant, they are very small. On average, uninsured and Medicaid patients are treated by physicians who have at most one less year of experience than physicians treating Medicare patients; the predicted probabilities of being treated by a board-certified or toptrained physician are less than three percentage points lower for uninsured or Medicaid patients.
We also analyzed whether differences in physician quality were related to hospital characteristics in a separate model that included hospital-specific variables. Our results indicate that, on average, among notfor-profit, for-profit, and teaching hospitals there is little difference in the likelihood a patient is treated by a board-certified physician or a physician trained at a top-30 medical school or top-50 residency location. However, at government hospitals the mean probability a patient is treated by a boardcertified or top-trained physician is 3.6 and 4.6 percentage points lower, respectively, than the probabilities at not-for-profit hospitals.
A hospital's ability to attract the best physicians may be affected by the insurance mix of patients at the hospital, as discussed previously. Our results indicate that in most cases the relationships between physician quality and a hospital's type of ownership was not related to the hospital's insurance mix. Overall, patients are most likely to be treated by a board-certified physician at a not-for-profit hospital where more than 20% of the patients are poor.
For more than 50% of patients receiving cardiac care at government hospitals, the mean probability of treatment by a physician from a top-30 school or top-50 residency ranges from 18.3% to 20.1%, compared to a mean of 26.1% across all privately owned, non-teaching hospitals. Also, across government-owned hospitals, the probability that a patient is treated by a board-certified physician is 7.4 percentage points lower at hospitals where more than 26.7% of the patients are poor, compared to those where less than 14.5% of the patients are poor.
We conclude that based on our three exogenous measures of physician attributes, discrimination against uninsured and Medicaid patients within hospitals is minor. Also, cardiac patients who attend hospitals where a high percentage of patients are poor are not necessarily less likely to be treated by a highly trained physician. However, patients at government hospitals where the percentage of poor patients is high have significantly lower probabilities of being treated by a boardcertified or top-trained physician relative to patients at not-for-profit, for-profit, and teaching hospitals.
Therefore, physician behavior within hospitals leads to very small quality disparities for low-income groups. This may be due partly to the fact that we limited our study to cardiac episodes, which require relatively specialized care, and the within-hospital variation in physicians treating these patients is relatively small. We would expect this to be true for other illnesses requiring specialized care, but might expect more within-hospital discrimination when the spectrum of available physicians is larger.
Limitations of the study should also be mentioned. We use administrative data on patients and hospitals from the state of Florida, which is not specifically designed for analyses such as those conducted in this study. Also, it is highly likely that there are physician characteristics, in addition to the ones studied here, that are significant determinants of patients' outcomes and perhaps patients' overall satisfaction with their quality of care. Finally, since we only examined hospitals in the state of Florida, implications of the impact of hospital characteristics may not extend to hospitals in other states.
Numerous state and federal health reform plans are moving in directions that promise universal access to health care. As these plans are implemented, states should carefully consider how their provider payment design affects the incentives for medical providers to supply not only access to care, but quality care to the poor. Our study concluded that patients in government hospitals that treat large numbers of uninsured and Medicaid patients are least likely to be treated by a board-certified or toptrained physician. Since most of these patients have government-based health insurance, any policy reforms should focus on improving incentives to attract top physicians to government hospitals.
Notes
1 The Florida AHCA defines uncompensated charity care as that portion of hospital charges ''for which there is no compensation, other than restricted or unrestricted revenues provided to a hospital by local governments or tax districts regardless of the method of payment …'' (Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2005, p.137). The statistics provided in the text are based on 164 short-term hospitals, including 151 general hospitals, five not-for-profit teaching hospitals, two rehabilitation hospitals, two children's hospitals, and four specialty hospitals. The total uncompensated charity care reported was $1,966,818,227. This figure does not include charity care provided by two hospitals to comply with the requirements of the Hill-Burton Hospital and Medical Facilities Construction plan, which totaled $10,283,518 in 2004. The charity care is reported as deductions from revenue. These deductions may be offset by restricted donations and grants for indigent care and/or unrestricted tax revenue and appropriated funds from the government. Across the 164 hospitals, restricted donations and grants for indigent care totaled $1,114,958; funds from state/federal and local governments totaled $50,559,656 and $30,300,689, respectively, for a final total of $81,975,303 in offsets. 2 The medical school ranking is based on the schools' selectivity in admitting students. According to the U.S. News and World Report, schools are ranked ''from most to least selective based on a formula that combines average MCAT scores and undergraduate GPA for the entering class as well as the school's acceptance rates.'' The other two rankings that could be used are research rank and primary care rank. Research ranking is based heavily on amount of research dollars flowing to the school and publications by faculty at the school. Primary care rank includes the number of graduates entering primary care fields, which is not a very useful measure when looking at cardiac care. While rankings on research dollars or primary care are available, we thought that school selectivity best measures the quality of graduates at the school. 3 To examine the extent to which our independent variables are capturing the heterogeneity of cardiac diseases, we ran a probit model with '''deceased'' as the dependent variable and only patient characteristics as independent variables. The pseudo R 2 was .57 for the entire sample, .55 when the model is estimated only for Medicare patients, and .61 when the model is estimated only for non-Medicare patients.
Since in-hospital mortality is a bit of a crude measure of health and these pseudo R 2 measures are still very high, we feel confident these patient characteristics are able to pick up a great deal of heterogeneity in patients' health. 4 The summary statistics for patient characteristics in Table 1 are based on all observations that are included in estimation of the hospital fixed-effects model from equation 1 for one of the three physician characteristics-344,202 observations. The summary statistics for hospital characteristics in Table 1 and all statistics in Table 2 are based on all observa-tions that are included in estimation of the model with hospital characteristics from equation 2-340,187. There are slightly fewer observations in the model with hospital characteristics because we do not observe these characteristics for all hospitals. 5 These charges are reported and certified by the hospitals to the Agency for Health Care Administration, Florida Center for Health Information and Policy Analysis. The riskadjustment methodology developed by 3M Corporation is based on All Patient Refined Diagnostic Related Groups (http://www.3m. com/product/information/All-Patient-Refined-DRG-Software.html). 6 Specifically, we calculated the cumulative standard normal distribution for equation 2 after setting the respective hospital ownership indicator equal to one, and then displayed the mean for all patients within hospitals of that ownership type. For example, using equation 2, the predicted probability a patient is treated by a toptrained physician at government-owned hospitals is: W (Xa + a 6 + a 8 %Poor Patients + a 10 %Poor Patients).
